The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the most recently established international criminal tribunal. It was created by the UN Security Council in 2007 to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others in 2005. However, the process of creating the tribunal did not comply with Lebanese Constitutional provisions. This paper sheds light on the politics of selective justice, recalling impunity in Lebanon before and after Hariri's assassination. It also exposes the UN Security Council's double standards and argues that by creating the tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Lebanon's sovereignty was compromised.
INTRODUCTION
On February 14, 2005, Valentine's Day, at 12:56 PM a massive explosion on Beirut's Mediterranean coastline took the life of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 people who were accompanying him or happened to be at the site of the blast. The explosion also injured 231 persons and damaged public and private property in a 500-meter radius. Forensic examination of the explosion indicated that the equivalent of 2,500 kilograms of TNT (trinitrotoluene) was detonated by a suicide bomber using an improvised explosive device (IED) from inside a Mitsubishi van close to the convoy transporting Hariri along the sea road from the Parliament in Beirut's Downtown district to his residence in the city 1 . Among the dead were several of Hariri's bodyguards, former Minister of the Economy Bassel Fleihan 2 , bystanders who happened to be walking on the beach front at the fateful time, and several Syrian workers in a nearby construction site.
The United Nations Security Council reacted immediately to the assassination, condemning it as a "terrorist act" and sending a fact-finding mission to *Address corresponding to this author at the Al-Akhbar Research Unit -Beirut, Lebanon; Tel: +9611759500 ext. 325; Fax: +9611759597; E-mails: onashabe@al-akhbar.com, omarnashabe@windowslive.com Beirut. Within two months, the UNSC had set up a formal UN investigation commission amidst strong, though unsubstantiated accusations pointing to elements within the Syrian regime-in collusion with their Lebanese allies within the security establishment-as the culprits. With the political and security situation extremely tense in Lebanon, and the state effectively split, the UNSC in 2007authorized the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) based in the Hague. On January 17, 2011, after more than 5 years of international criminal investigations, the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Daniel Bellemare filed a confidential indictment to the pre-trial judge Daniel Fransen, initially accusing four members of Hezbollah of involvement in the assassination of Hariri. The first and so far the only indictment in this case was published, after it was confidentially amended at the request of Pre-trial Judge Daniel Fransen, on August 17, 2011 3 .
According to the UNSC, the STL is allegedly aimed at ending impunity in Lebanon and its operation was to be "based on the highest international standards of criminal justice." Yet, several structural and procedural problems associated with the STL and the political context indicate that these contentions are deeply problematic.
This paper thus offers a critique of the history, structure and procedures of the international criminal investigation and the establishment of the STL. Its central arguments are that: (1) launching an international criminal investigation in the Hariri case was politicized and highly selective in light of the history of political assassinations in Lebanon; (2) the establishment of the STL does not comply with the Lebanon's Constitution, undermining Lebanon's sovereignty; and (3) the standards of the international criminal investigation and the STL were set to fulfill political purposes. It concludes that while these problems have thus undermined the original calls for justice and the ending of impunity in Lebanon, even leading to further division and violence, there are still steps that can be taken to serve the cause of international justice for Hariri while also protecting state institutions and the political process in Lebanon.
THE POLITICS OF SELECTIVE JUSTICE: WHY THE STL NOW?
Political assassinations are not new to Lebanon 4 . Riad El-Solh, the first post-independence prime minister, was assassinated in 1951. This was followed by a series of assassinations targeting politicians, journalists and religious leaders. The list includes members of parliament Naim Moghabghab (1960 ), Maarouf Saad (1975 , Tony Frangieh, his wife and daughter and 30 others (1978 ,), Kamal Joumblatt (1977 , Nazem El- Kadri (1989 ), Elie Hobeika (2002 and Dany Chamoun, his wife and their two children (1990) . Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khalid (1989 ), Sheikh Sobhi Saleh (1986 ), Sheikh Ahmad Assaf (1987 ), Imam Hassan Al-Shirazi (1980 ), Sheikh Halim Taqieddine (1987 and Sheikh Nizar Halabi (1995) were also assassinated. In 1978, Imam Mousa Sadr, disappeared with two companions, journalist Abbas Badred-dine and Sheikh Mohamad Yakoub, while they were in Libya.
President-elect, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in 1982 (14 September) and President Rene Muawad was assassinated on Independence Day (November 22) 1989, while an attempt was made on the life of former president Camille Chamoun back in 1980. 4 Haven et. Al, defines political assassinations as "deliberate, extralegal killings of individuals for political purposes" Haven, M.C., Leiden C. & Schmitt, K. M (1970) The Politics of Assassination (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall) page 4. However, according to Bosco (2009) , debates over the assassination of Rafik Hariri reflect fundamental differences on the meaning and definition of political assassination. (Bosco, R.M. (2009) , The Assassination of Rafik Hariri: Foreign Policy Perspectives. International Political Science Review, Vol. 30, No. 4, [349] [350] [351] [352] [353] [354] [355] [356] [357] [358] [359] [360] [361] . Ben-Yehuda (1997) further claims that the characterization of an event as a political assassination, an execution, or an act of terror is always a political, social and cultural construction. (Ben-Yehuda, N. (1997 , or were whitewashed by amnesty laws and international silence. To be sure, this appalling record does not, in of itself, make the assassination of Hariri less deserving of proper investigation and fair punishment for the perpetrators. But this paper suggests that the legal and moral basis for pursuing justice in the Hariri case while refraining from doing so in many of these other cases is not a coincidence and is thus seriously problematic as it reflects the politics of selective justice. The STL jurisdiction, after all, is explicitly limited to the Hariri assassination and other related assassinations. This selective approach to access to justice is further analyzed on two levels: on the international level, where the UN Security Council used double standards in reacting to mass murder, atrocities and political assassinations in Lebanon and elsewhere; and on the local level, where amnesty laws and "particular pardons" were granted in previous assassinations of similar gravity. Security Council used its powers under Chapter seven of the UN Charter to maintain its dominance over Lebanon. Marxist theory may further suppose that the Security Council reacted to the murder of Rafik Hariri by actively supporting the creation of an international tribunal, because he was one of the richest people in the World 7 , whereas the council did not actively react to numerous other crimes because the victims of such crimes were persons whose wealth and power cannot be compared with Hariri's wealth and power. This for Marx one of the main functions of law is to respond to power relationships. This also applies to UN Security Council Resolutions. The "legal superstructure", according to Pashukanis, exists and functions because behind it "stands an organization of the ruling class, namely the apparatus of coercion and power". This does not mean that the Security Council has to use force in every case. "Much is achieved by simple threat, by the knowledge of helplessness and of the futility of struggle, by economic pressure, and finally by the fact that the working classes are in the ideological captivity of the exploiters" 8 .
UNSC's Internationalization of an Assassination
The United Nations Security Council reaction to Hariri's assassination differed from its reaction to an assassination which occurred during the same period, and which was similar to Hariri's assassination in terms of modus operandi, background and circumstances. This supports the argument that the UNSC's selective intervention and its decisions on what constitutes threats to international peace and security is politically motivated and that the Security Council's resolutions' reference to judicial arguments to establish the UNIIIC and the STL is inadequate.
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto was assassinated on December 27, 2007. The President of the Security Council issued a statement condemning "in the strongest terms the terrorist suicide attack" against Bhutto, but did not request the Secretary-General "to follow closely the situation … and to report urgently on the circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act" as was the case Knudsen, "The 15-year-long civil war (1975-90) was extremely bloody, with atrocities and massacres committed by all sides to the conflict. The war inflicted physical damage estimated at U$25 Billion, more than halved the country's GDP, caused massive human suffering, including more than 150,000 deaths, displaced some 800,000 people and increased emigration from the country (...) more than 3,600 car bombs killed close to 4,500 people" Knudsen A. (2010) than by the desire to pursue justice or confront a broader culture of impunity 26 .
No End to Impunity: Lebanon's Amnesty for Assassinations and Wartime Atrocities
One of the main arguments in favor of establishing the STL was Lebanon's desire to end impunity, yet the record of the post-civil war period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) shows clearly that Lebanon's politicians had no serious will to hold those responsible of wartime atrocities and political assassinations accountable. No special judicial body was created to prosecute those responsible of wartime atrocities and the perpetrators were pardoned by an amnesty law. Several warlords became Members of Parliament and high ranking government officials. This confirms Marxist interpretation of law and the functioning of the judicial system. Impunity from prosecution in Lebanon was fostered by amnesty laws. The Lebanese Constitution (Article 53 Paragraph 9) allows the President to grant "particular pardons" and empowers the Government and the parliament to vote general amnesty laws. Thus the same majority in the Lebanese Parliament passed an amnesty law for the murderer of one prime minister, but strongly supported the request to the United Nations to investigate and prosecute the case of the assassination of another prime minister. Yet, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established based on a document which specifically recalls Seniora's request 32 , disregarding the fact that state-sanctioned impunity in Lebanon allowed targeted political assassinations to continue 33 .
Another kind of selective access to justice is in relation to the Lebanese civil war (1975 Lebanese civil war ( -1990 and to the devastating July-August 2006 war which included a long list of serious human rights violations and brutal massacres, yet there was never any criminal investigation of these violations nor were those responsible brought to justice. Instead, in the case of civil war crimes, the Lebanese government passed a general amnesty Law in 1991 which granted amnesty for crimes committed by militias and armed groups before 28 March 1991. The amnestied leaders of militias that had "committed savage murders, often 29 It may be argued that the bombing of Hariri's motorcade cannot be compared to armed forces' bombardment of civilian infrastructure and UN bases in Lebanon, and the ensuing slaughter. It should be noted that the right to access justice equally applies to victims of the bombardment of civil targets in Israel. However, it is access to justice for the victims that is at issue here. Neither Lebanese nor Israeli victims of the bloody events of 2006 have had access to international justice.
It may also be argued that the STL's selective justice should not imply denying access to justice in some cases as long as it's denied in other cases. This may be considered a valid argument if the selective process was not politically motivated and if the establishment of the STL complied with Lebanese constitutional provisions. The following section shows that this was not the case. From a constitutional point of view, it should be noted that at the time the agreement was signed, there had been a devastating war (in July-August 2006) and six ministers, five of whom represented the total number of Muslim Shiite ministers, had resigned from the government. Paragraph J of The Lebanese Constitution's Preamble states "there is no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the 'pact of communal coexistence'", which requires a representative presence of all major religious sects in the government.
COMPROMISING LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY
The President of the Republic negotiates international treaties in coordination with the Council of Ministers. Treaties are to be ratified by the Parliament whenever the national interest and security of the state are involved, according to article 52 of the Constitution. However, the agreement to establish a Special Tribunal for Lebanon was neither negotiated by the President nor ratified by the Parliament. Therefore, the cabinet deliberations and its endorsement of the draft for the international agreement to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon "bypassed Lebanon's constitutional provisions" 38 . The President of the Republic, Emile Lahoud, denounced the Tribunal as "lacking any legal authority whatsoever"
39
, and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, claimed that signing the agreement was unconstitutional since the government was considered unconstitutional after the resignation of the Muslim Shiite ministers. Charter, Article 2, paragraph 1), was used by the Security Council to bypass Parliament. This approach differs from previous uses of Chapter VII to establish international tribunals. In the case of The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the use of Chapter VII was sparked by serious Human Rights violations and atrocities. This does not apply in the Hariri assassination case. Lebanon was not suffering from Human Rights violations that necessitate international intervention, and its parliament did not agree to permit such intervention in its internal affairs. However, it was argued that the United States, which has the strongest influence on the Security Council, politicized the judicial process 40 by pushing for the establishment of the STL under Chapter VII.
Political Maneuver
One third of the Security Council's members, including two permanent members, did not vote in favor of Resolution 1757. Nasser Abdul Aziz Al-Nasser, the Ambassador of Qatar, representing the only Arab state in the Council, expressed his country's support for the internal Lebanese constitutional process and stressed that the resolution which includes the statute of the Tribunal, "entailed legal encroachments" 41 .
Hasan Kleib representing Indonesia reminded the council that "Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter stressed that nothing contained in it would authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State". as part of its wider strategy to pressure Syria to abandon its alleged support for extremist groups across the region"
43
. France and the US also viewed the STL as an important tool to rid Lebanon of Syrian influence 44 . In sum, the establishment of an international tribunal was a Western political maneuver to create a tool that can be manipulated to put pressure on Syria and Iran. The fact that STL indictments targeted pro-Iran and pro-Syrian Hezbollah officials was not a coincidence.
Selective International Cooperation
However, the Security Council failed to compel its members to cooperate with the STL. President Antonio Cassese admitted in February 2011 that "in the absence of binding UN Security Council resolutions to enforce cooperation (due to the peculiar legal position of the Special Tribunal), no solid legal framework has therefore been established for cooperation with States other than Lebanon" 45 . He also explained that "various states" refused to sign a cooperation agreement with the STL because of "domestic difficulties". Instead, these states have offered to cooperate "informally and on a case by case basis". This provides opportunities for selective cooperation based on the political interests of these states and points that what applies to bypassing Lebanon's constitution may not apply to other members of the UN.
STL's Unlimited Access to Official Records
On June 5, 2009, Lebanese Minister of Justice Ibrahim Najjar (on behalf of the Lebanese Government) and STL Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which granted international investigators access to unlimited official records. Paragraph 3 of the MoU states that the Lebanese Government will provide all necessary assistance to the STL office of the prosecutor with regard to access to all records, statements, material elements and evidence related to the crimes that fall Hariri urged Minister of Interior Ziyad Baroud and Telecommunications Minister Charbel Nahhas to comply with the requests, which included allowing STL investigators to question ministry employees and obtain documents and telecommunications data.
Minister Nahhas told Speaker Berri on March 1, 2011 that "Bellemare had requested comprehensive information about telephone conversations among the Lebanese, including ministers and lawmakers, and that this violated the public freedom and eavesdropping law"
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. According to Nahhas, Bellemare had access to unofficial telecom data but he requested the Telecommunications Ministry to authorize access to official data so it could be used as evidence 49 . The defiant minister confirmed that he had ignored several requests from the STL because they "were contrary to Lebanese law as concerns the secrecy of phone records and immunity given to deputies and presidents" 50 . ethical standards. Questions can also be raised concerning the wording of the indictment, the emphasis placed on telecommunication, selection of staff and impunity for arbitrary detention in the Hariri case.
QUESTIONABLE STANDARDS

Detlev Mehlis's Breaches
Berlin's prosecutor Detlev Mehlis was appointed on May 13, 2005 as commissioner for the UNIIIC. Mehlis was known for his controversial role in investigating the1986 Berlin terrorist attack on the Labelle Disco in Berlin. The methods he used in his investigations seemed highly controversial. A 1999 Amnesty International Report reads: "The trial of five people accused of a bomb attack continued in Germany. The prosecution claimed that the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque in 1986, apparently targeting US military personnel, had been carried out on direct orders from the Libyan intelligence service. In July a court in Berlin ruled that the confession of a former Libyan diplomat, Musbah 'Eter, was inadmissible because a prosecutor [Detlev Mehlis] had wrongly given the impression that he would be spared a life prison sentence if he confessed to a role in the bombing. A few days later the prosecution's challenge of the ruling failed. In August, the prosecution appealed again before a different chamber of the appeal court" 51 .
On August 25, 1998, German public television's ZDF reported that several leading suspects in the 1986 Berlin bombing "were being protected from prosecution by western intelligence services"
52
. These included "a group of terrorists led by Mahmoud Abu Jaber", a man allegedly involved in the preparation of the Labelle attack. Abu Jaber's right-hand man, Mohammed Amairi was, according to his own lawyer Odd Drevland, an agent for the Israeli Mossad. After fleeing to Norway, Amairi was arrested and investigated. However, according to Drevland, the Mossad intervened and "everything changed" and Amairi was granted asylum. , and it submitted six reports to the Security Council. The Commissioner underlined the fact that the inquiry only makes sense if it leads to a judicial process and that it is committed to a Special Tribunal. However, after two years of criminal investigations, the evidence gathered remained insufficient to issue indictments. The only substantial sign of progress in his investigation appeared in his third report in which Brammertz confirmed the theory of a suicide bombing in the assassination of Hariri 63 .
Prosecutor Bellemare's Standards
Brammertz stepped down on January 1, 2008 and was replaced by Daniel Bellemare. 59 Translated from Arabic to English by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and published on its website: http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/relevant-law-andcase-law/applicable-law/lebanese-code-of-criminal-procedure 60 Khairallah (2008) asked: "Has anyone heard of a criminal investigator, a district attorney or a special prosecutor making public the names and testimonies of witnesses he has heard, evidence he has collected, or strategies he is pursuing before the end of the investigation?". Page 591. 61 Shehadi, Nadim & Wilmshurst, Elizabeth (2007) as UNIIIC Commissioner to be metamorphosed into the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal upon its launch. In fact, the STL Prosecutor's work is supposed to be a continuation of UNIIIC's work, whereas Article 19(2) of the Agreement establishing the STL (Attached to Resolution 1757) states that it "shall commence functioning on a date to be determined by the Secretary General in consultation with the Government, taking into account the progress of the work of the UNIIIC".
The Prosecutor, and former UNIIIC Commissioner, were inconsistent in applying proper standards for the investigation. Bellemare openly visited Syria, held interviews with Hezbollah officials, and conducted investigative projects in Beirut's Southern suburbs as will be shown later in this paper. However, he and his staff were never reported to have visited Israel .Nor did they interview possible Israeli witnesses.
On August 8, 2010, in a two-hour long television appearance, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah presented information pointing to Israel's possible involvement in the Hariri assassination. He said: "We have definite information on the aerial movements of the Israeli enemy the day Hariri was murdered. Hours before he was murdered, an Israeli drone was surveying the Sidon-Beirut-Jouniyeh coastline as warplanes were flying over Beirut (…) This video can be acquired by any investigative Commission to ensure that it is correct. We are sure of this evidence or else we would not risk showing it". Israel was quick to dismiss the allegation, despite the fact that the Israeli Army admitted in October 2010 that some of the information that Nasrallah revealed, concerning the aerial movements of the Israelis, was genuine 65 . Nasrallah acknowledged that the images he showed during his television appearance and the information he provided were not conclusive evidence against Israel. However, there were no signs that STL Office of the Prosecutor has investigated or is even interested in investigating possible Israeli involvement in the Hariri assassination. In sum, the STL Prosecutor publicly revealed selective information about the identity of persons he interviewed. This may be considered at best noncompliance with the "highest standards of international criminal justice" stated in UNSC 1757, and at worst, a politically motivated breach of the confidentiality of the criminal investigation.
Breaches of Confidentiality
Further breaches of confidentiality concern information about the STL's indictment of Hezbollah adherents. This was leaked by Bellemare (or by his staff) to Rafik Hariri's son, Saad. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in July 2010, more than one year before the indictment was made public, that Hariri had told him that arrest warrants would soon be issued by the STL against members of his organization. Hariri claimed that, initially, three arrest warrants were expected to be issued, but by the end of 2010, between 20 and 50 Hezbollah officials could be taken to court. During a personal meeting between the two men, Hariri expressed concern about the country's unity and said that he believed leaders of Hezbollah would not be affected by the arrest warrants but that only "rogue members" of the organization will be targeted. Nasrallah, for his part, dismissed the arrest warrants as "totally unacceptable" claiming that the court was being influenced by Israel.
Among those to be indicted, "according to the people briefed on it, is Mustafa Badreddine, a senior Hezbollah official and brother-in-law of the Hezbollah military commander Chief Imad Mughniyah, who was among the Federal Bureau of Investigation's mostwanted men before his assassination nearly three years ago"
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. Mughniyah was also believed by Bellemare's investigators to have played a role in the car bombing that killed Hariri.
On May 23, 2009the German Der Spiegel published a controversial report that included confidential UNIIIC records. The report's author, journalist Erich Folath, claimed that he "has learned from sources close to the tribunal and verified by examining internal documents, that the Hariri case is about to take a sensational turn. Intensive investigations in Lebanon are all pointing to a new conclusion: that it was not the Syrians, but instead special forces of the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah that planned and executed the diabolical attack. Tribunal prosecutor Bellemare and his judges apparently want to hold back this information, which they have been aware of for about a month" 68 . Bellemare refused to comment.
The actual STL indictment that was made public in August 2011 included information that was almost identical to a Canadian Media report (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation-CBC) of late 2010
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. The report referred to investigators who worked with Bellemare and showed copies of confidential investigation records, claiming that "evidence gathered by Lebanese police and, much later, the UN, points overwhelmingly to the fact that the assassins were from Hezbollah, the militant Party of God (Hezbollah) that is largely sponsored by Syria and Iran. CBC News has obtained cell phone and other telecommunications evidence that is at the core of the case". The report concluded that telecommunications analysis led to "the single biggest breakthrough the commission had accomplished since its formation" 70 . This additional breach of confidentiality by the STL Prosecutor's criminal investigators shows, here again, that the standards followed by the STL are questionable, especially since there was no sign of any investigation to hold accountable those who were responsible for the leaks.
Breach of Ethical Standards
As chief investigator at the STL Office of the Prosecutor, Michael Taylor enjoys access to a vast amount of data and official records from the Lebanese Government and its security and intelligence agencies, including personal status records, phone records, vehicle registration, and Lebanese University student records as mentioned earlier in this paper. However, his two male investigators who are part of Taylor's team, an Australian and a Frenchman, attempted on October 27, 2010 to collect further information about Hezbollah adherents from the office of gynecologist Iman Sharara. The office is located in the Hezbollah stronghold of Southern Beirut, and the investigators had arranged "an appointment with the purpose of examining the records of at least 14 people who had visited her clinic since 2003" 71 . Both the Lebanese Medical Association and the Ministry of Health were not approached and did not approve access to gynecological medical records. Yet Taylor's investigators decided to proceed in a clear violation of ethical and professional standards.
However, STL investigators were not allowed to complete their task as they were attacked by a number of women. The attackers snatched a briefcase that one of the investigators was carrying which contained a laptop and official STL documents. STL President, Judge Antonio Cassese, addressed the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon and Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri on October 29, 2010, conveying "the Tribunal's great concern about the incident which took place in Beirut on 27 October." He added that the "incident will not be allowed to jeopardize the work of the Tribunal"
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. However, Taylor's team did not attempt to visit the Sharara's office or any other location in Southern Beirut again. No one was arrested and the STL did not recognize or investigate this breach of ethical and professional standards, and its property was not returned.
Questionable Evidence: Telecommunication
In addition to the breaches of ethical standards, sources of doubt in the credibility of the Prosecutor's investigations also include the integrity of the collected data. Bellemare's investigators focused on collecting telecommunication data, which is highly controversial. The UNIIIC report released back on October 20, 2005, found that high-ranking members of the Syrian and Lebanese governments were involved in the Hariri assassination. The report based its findings on patterns of telephone calls between specific prepaid phone cards that connected prominent Lebanese and Syrian officials to events surrounding the crime. Bellemare apparently followed the same method to indict the four members of Hezbollah on January 2011. However, on However, the STL indictment emphasized telecommunication evidence, and according to paragraph 22 of the indictment, data of several cell phones used before Hariri's assassination revealed that they were active at the same location, on the same date, and within the same timeframe as other phones. The indictment also stated: "It is reasonable to conclude from these instances that one person is using multiple phones together when over a significant period, the patterns of use for each phone never deviate in an inexplicable manner, the phones are recorded by cell towers as being together over 73 The STL investigators placed emphasis on evidence related to telecommunication, despite the possibility of Israeli tampering with the data.
Inadequate STL Selection of Staff
STL staff breaches of professional and ethical standards also raise questions about the background of investigators and legal officers at the Office of the Prosecutor. In fact, the criteria used by the STL to employ staff seems questionable because, several employees were known for their lack of respect of the legal principle of presumption of innocence, and one senior official was under criminal investigation when he was appointed at the STL. Some of these employees were involved in the investigation and in putting together the indictment. Soon after the launch of the Tribunal in 2009, Dureid Bsherrawi was appointed legal officer at the STL's Office of the Prosecutor. In an article published in "An-Nahar" newspaper, Bsherrawi had expressed "fears of the possibility of failure in reaching the truth about Hariri's assassination, if some Security Council members strike a political deal with the Syrian regime at the expense of the International Tribunal for Lebanon" 80 . This implies that he was convinced of Syrian or pro-Syrian involvement in the assassination. Such expressions of prejudice should disqualify the candidate from becoming the legal advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor. Apparently not in this case. 
Questionable Rules of Procedures and Evidence
Although most of STL's rules of procedures and evidence are based on the rules of other international criminal tribunals, some of the amendments to these rules seem politically motivated. . The new framework allegedly creates "more legal certainty for accused and other parties in the proceedings" 87 . The Judges also clarified the admissibility of written statements by witnesses unable to come and testify "for good reasons". These amendments may be seen as a political response following Nasrallah's declaration that he did not recognize the STL's legitimacy 88 . This represents a clear breach of the basic guarantees for the attainment of justice because Judges should have the authority to question the source of "evidence" collected by the prosecutor and presented in court.
Rule 117 allows non-disclosure of information to protect "security interests of states and other international entities". This rule states that where the disclosure of information "may affect the security interests of a State or international entity, the Prosecutor may apply ex parte to the Pre-Trial Judge sitting in camera for an order to be relieved of his obligation to disclose in whole or in part". Rule 118 also expands on this by noting that "where the Prosecutor is in possession of information which was provided on a confidential basis and which affects the security interests of a State or international entity or an agent thereof, he shall not disclose that information or its origin without the consent of the person or entity providing the information". The rules also grant the prosecution the opportunity to select the presentation format of witness statements: "the Prosecutor shall take reasonable steps to obtain the consent of the provider to (i) disclose that information or the fact of its existence to the accused or (ii) provide an alternative form of disclosure such as: identification of new similar information; provision of the information in summarized or redacted form; or stipulation of the relevant facts. If the Prosecutor obtains such consent, the Prosecutor shall make the disclosure that has been consented to without delay". Hence, once the consent of the witness is secured the prosecution is granted an opportunity to rephrase his or her statements and present it in a way that may limit the defense's prospect for efficient crossexamination 90 .
Indicting Nasrallah
Bellemare's indictment of certain members of Hezbollah, not its leadership or any of its officials has been part of Western official statements about Lebanon. Former British Ambassador to Lebanon Frances Guy emphasized that "the tribunal is not going to accuse any sect or any party; it is going to accuse 89 STL Rules of Procedures and Evidence are available on the STL website: http://www.stl-tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/BackgroundDocuments/ RulesRegulations/RPE_EN_November%202010.pdf 90 Nashabe, O. (February 2011 The Tribunal's Statute states clearly: "with respect to superior and subordinate relationships, a superior shall be criminally responsible for any of the crimes (…) committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: (a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information that clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; (b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and (c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution" 93 .
As Salim Ayyash, Mustapha Badreddine, Hussein Oneissi & Assad Sabra were accused of committing the crime, it would be argued that their superiors failed to realize that they were about to commit such a crime, especially since more than two tons of explosives had to be transported and placed in a vehicle, and a large number of people had to be mobilized to collect information about the target's transportation and daily schedule. to include his personal political opinion and perhaps the views of some of his colleagues in an international indictment.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The United Nations International Independent Investigative Commission and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon were established by the UN Security Council to investigate the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others, and, supposedly, to achieve justice. However, limitations to the STL's jurisdiction showed signs of politically motivated selective justice. The STL has not addressed the larger legacy of political assassination and war crimes that have marked Lebanon's past. As such, this paper suggests that it is therefore unlikely to contribute to ending impunity in Lebanon.
This paper also argued that the establishment of the STL was a compromise to Lebanon's sovereignty because the UNSC bypassed Lebanon's constitutional provisions.
High-level Media leaks about the criminal investigation, further undermines the credibility of the Tribunal. As for its rules of procedures and evidence, they may allow disregarding the manipulability of some sources of evidence, not least from telecommunications.
The UNIIIC and the STL investigators did not look into possible Israeli involvement in the Hariri assassination, and the indictment does not seem to be based on persuasive evidence because it is based on telecommunication data that may have been altered by Israeli intelligence and because part of its wording seems politically motivated.
Finding effective remedies for the structural and procedural ills of the STL is a major challenge. It may require Lebanese minimum consensus on the separation between attaining justice and political interests.
Stretching the STL's jurisdiction to include other serious crimes that were committed since 2005 may contribute to improving its local reputation as a judicial mechanism. As for the atrocities of the civil war, establishing a truth and reconciliation commission may be necessary especially since thousands are still missing. However, discussing these matters, the agreement to establish the STL and its rules of procedures and evidence, in the Lebanese parliament may be essential to consolidate local ownership of justice.
Concerning the STL's procedural ills and in order to make sure it functions according to the highest standards of international criminal justice, an independent monitoring mechanism should be suggested, and modes of accountability for judges, prosecutors, legal officers and defense counsels have to be defined.
The search for remedies requires further criminal justice, Law and political science research, and broad discussions among scholars, legal experts and politicians.
Such research is much needed because The STL's political context and its dubious procedures, serve neither justice nor ending impunity in Lebanon, but rather threaten the very basis of the Lebanese state that is built on local consensus. [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] Lebanese civil war 
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Chronology of Events
